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## Viewing cable 09MEXICO1993, MEXICO'S PRI CONSIDERING NEXT STEPS AFTER ELECTION

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### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

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### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#09MEXICO1993**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
<a href="#">09MEXICO1993</a>	<a href="#">2009-07-08 17:31</a>	<a href="#">2011-08-30 01:44</a>	<a href="#">CONFIDENTIAL</a>	<a href="#">Embassy Mexico</a>

Appears in these articles:

<http://wikileaks.jornada.com.mx/notas/el-mandatario-mexiquense-financia-empresas-encuestadoras-que-den-resultados-a-su-favor>

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FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7367  
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE  
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC  
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC  
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC  
RUCPDO/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC  
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL  
RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM  
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 001993

SENSITIVE  
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2017  
TAGS: [ECON](#) [MX](#) [PGOV](#) [PINR](#) [PREL](#)  
SUBJECT: MEXICO'S PRI CONSIDERING NEXT STEPS AFTER ELECTION  
WIN  
Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor James P. Merz.  
Reason: 1.4 (b), (d).

11. (C) Summary. The Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) is now evaluating next steps and adapting its legislative approach to the new political reality following the July 5 elections. The party may be more proactive in shaping the congressional agenda and confronting the Calderon government on key issues. Nevertheless, the PRI will still be constrained by the PAN-controlled Senate, as well as by the fact that its work with President Calderon and the PAN congressional bloc over the past three years has paid popular dividends. The party will have to be careful not to overstep the bounds of responsible legislative behavior or risk squandering the electoral support it painstakingly sought and received in the July 5 mid-term elections. End Summary.

PRI Debating Next Steps...

12. (C) PRI contacts tell us the party has been somewhat surprised by the degree of its success in the midterm congressional and state elections and is now in the process of adapting its legislative approach to the new political reality. The final deputy count is not fully tabulated, but the PRI will likely end up with some 241 Chamber of Deputy seats. The party is hoping it will be able to consolidate an absolute legislative majority without entering into a formal coalition with its electoral partner, the Green Party of Mexico (PVEM). Carlos Flores Rico, a well-connected party leader whose high placement on the plurinominal list assures him a slot in Congress, told Poloffs on July 7 that the PRI would prefer not to pursue a close alliance with the PVEM since it is squeamish about almost every PVEM proposal, especially reinstating the death penalty. Suggesting the PRI has a list of names in mind, Flores Rico noted that the party will look instead to woo several disaffected National Action Party (PAN) and Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) deputies to formally defect into its camp. (Note: While some demoralized PRD legislators might view this offer as tempting, we highly doubt PAN deputies would be willing to so abscond from the party.)

13. (C) With an absolute majority -- or at least a stronger plurality than expected -- in sight, the PRI is debating toughening its approach toward President Calderon and his PAN party. Flores Rico confided that one current within the PRI is advocating for a more proactive, assertive stance in Congress vis-a-vis the Calderon government. Obviously within that camp himself, Flores Rico argued that the PRI has ridden PAN coattails in Congress long enough, and needs to begin to distinguish itself from its opponents in the run-up to the 2012 presidential elections. He said the PRI should

forcefully shape the congressional agenda and debate in the next three years. Conversely, PRI President Beatriz Paredes, long rumored to have made a quiet "non-aggression" pact with President Calderon and likely to assume the role of leader of the PRI Chamber bloc, prefers a more conciliatory approach. Flores Rico insinuated that the PRI will be more insistent once Congress convenes in September regardless of which side wins the debate and that only the degree of assertiveness will vary.

#### ...And Considering Its Legislative Agenda

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¶4. (C) The PRI is also looking to develop a more concrete legislative agenda. Flores Rico said (and Poloff agreed) that the lengthy party platform is vague and speaks in generalities, and that the PRI has yet to fully hone a more specific congressional outline. Despite an apparent dearth of detailed plans, both he and Paredes in her public statements confirmed that the party will be heavily focused on dealing with Mexico's faltering economy through social development projects, poverty reduction efforts, and what Paredes called the creation of a new "Economic Emergency Act" to ameliorate the negative impact of the crisis and unemployment. Flores Rico also unequivocally dismissed the possibility of significant fiscal or energy reform over the next three years. Earlier conversations with the PRI's Director of International Relations, Ceslo Delgado, also

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suggest that the PRI will look to improving the lot of Mexico's rural sector, perhaps by taking another look at agricultural-related portions of NAFTA.

¶5. (C) The party's security strategy may diverge somewhat more markedly from the PAN's over the next three years, as well, with a purported greater focus on social and institutional development rather than what Flores Rico claimed to be the administration's narrow law and order approach. He acknowledged that the continued domestic deployment of the military in the counternarcotics fight will remain necessary in the short-term, but said that the PRI will also advocate for greater attention to "soft side" programs such as domestic demand reduction and judicial reform. Flores Rico complained that the GOM touts its success in capturing easily replaceable mid-level cartel operatives but has yet to arrest any cartel kingpins. (Note: The GOM's record of high-level arrests since 2006 makes this claim patently false.) Finally, he noted that the Merida Initiative is problematic in that it lacks sufficient funding and is too focused on the country's law enforcement apparatus and not enough on development issues.

#### Party Reevaluates Pena Nieto

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¶6. (C) With the vote tally nearing completion, the PRI is a bigger winner in Mexico State than earlier reported, winning 38 of 40 districts (it won only 7 districts by direct election in 2006) and making inroads into both PAN and PRD territory. While a number of factors contribute to the party's unexpectedly large success there, Flores Rico said it has forced many in the PRI to reconsider Mexico State Governor Enrique Pena Nieto's political acumen. Earlier this year, Flores Rico -- mirroring what Poloff has heard from a number of party members -- opined that most of the PRI considered Pena Nieto to be a pretty face with nationwide appeal, but lacking in substance and political savvy. In contrast, Flores Rico said his ability to manage a competitive race in Mexico State and to prove himself a more than able campaigner and operative has significantly improved. At least for now, Pena Nieto's position in the party is clearly rising. The PRI's sweep of the Mexico State elections will also provide him with considerable influence in the Chamber of Deputies. Flores Rico explicitly acknowledged that Pena Nieto was by far the biggest winner on

July 5, but cautioned that the heir apparent still has three potentially treacherous years to navigate before the 2012 presidential elections, which give the governor's opponents ample time to scrutinize his official record and past personal history.

Comment

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17. (C) Early indications suggest that the PRI will be more assertive over the next three years as it looks to shape congressional debate and distinguish itself from the PAN. Particularly, the PRI will probably push an economic agenda that plays more to the middle and lower classes, in part as a genuine attempt to lessen the impact of the country's economic struggles but also to curry favor with key voting blocs in the run-up to the 2012 presidential campaign. Calderon's congressional defeat places the economic reform agenda and the federal budget firmly in the hands of the PRI.

Nevertheless, the party will still be constrained by the PAN-controlled Senate, as well as the reality that its work with President Calderon and the PAN congressional bloc over the past three years has paid popular dividends. The party will have to be careful not to overstep the bounds of responsible legislative behavior or risk squandering the popular support it has fought for since its 2006 electoral debacle.

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